Price discovery in the pre-opening period. theory and evidence from the madrid stock exchange by Brusco, Sandro et al.
 1 
 
 
Working Paper 03-58 Departamento de Economía de la Empresa 
Business Economics Series 14 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
October 2003 Calle Madrid, 126 
 28903 Getafe (Spain) 
 Fax (34-91) 6249608 
 
 
PRICE DISCOVERY IN THE PRE-OPENING PERIOD. 
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE MADRID STOCK EXCHANGE  
 
Sandro Brusco1, Carolina Manzano2 and Mikel Tapia*3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Some stock exchanges, such as the Spanish Stock Exchange and Euronext (Paris), allow traders 
to place orders in a ‘pre-opening’ period. Orders placed in this period are used to determine the 
opening price, and can be cancelled at any moment and at no cost by the traders. We consider a 
model in which noise traders can appear in the market before or after the opening, and a 
strategic informed trader decides her order strategy at the pre-opening and at the opening 
period. We characterize the equilibrium of such a model, showing that at the pre-opening there 
is a non-monotonic relation between the aggregate quantity ordered and prices. Thus, the 
equilibrium at the pre-opening stage is determined in a way which is fundamentally different 
from the equilibrium in the open market. We proceed to study the implications of the existence 
of a pre-opening period on information revelation and on the determination of the opening 
price. We present evidence from the Spanish Stock Exchange that seem to support the 
theoretical predictions, showing a clear different in behaviour between the market behaviour 
before and after the opening of the market. 
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1 Introduction
Various stock exchanges (e.g. Madrid and Paris) have a phase of ‘price
discovery’ in which agents place tentative orders and tentative prices are
quoted. The orders placed in this phase are not binding, since they can be
cancelled at no cost at any point before the official opening. The pre-opening
phase is usually quite active and many of the orders placed turn out to be
serious orders (see Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) for evidence from the
Paris Bourse). It is usually thought that the pre-opening phase helps mar-
kets to ‘find the right price’ at the opening, making public the information
accumulated during the no-trade period. Yet, from the theoretical point of
view it is not clear why this should be the case. In particular, since orders
placed in the pre-opening phase are non-binding, the first question one has
to answer is: Why do agents bother to place orders at all? In particular,
it appears that informed agents should be reluctant to place any order that
could reveal their information.
One way to overcome the difficulty is to assume that an order placed
during the pre-opening period has a strictly positive probability, although
possibly very low, of being executed. This may occur either because the
opening time of the market is stochastic, so that there is always a positive
probability that an order will be the final one, or because problems in com-
munication may prevent the trader from cancelling the order. The approach
has first been proposed by Vives (1995a, 1995b), who considers competitive
models in which a continuum of traders place limit orders. Biais, Hillion and
Spatt (1999) and Medrano and Vives (2001) have introduced the presence
of a strategic informed trader, who takes into account the effect of her
orders on information disclosure. In this class of models, agents place orders
in the pre-opening phase because there is a positive probability that the
order will be the final one. Thus, in order to exploit their superior informa-
tion, informed traders place meaningful orders. However, their orders will
be more ‘restrained’ than in the case in which trade occurs with probability
1. The reason is that by placing orders an informed trader reveals informa-
tion, and this reduces future profits if trade does not occur in the current
period.
In this paper we propose a different approach, not relying on a random
opening time. Our basic intuition is that in a market in which both in-
formed and noise traders are present, the pre-opening period provides, as a
minimum, a signal on the extent of noise trading.
Consider a simple two period model, in which agents place orders at the
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pre-opening period and at the ‘open market’ period. Orders at the pre-
opening period are essentially cheap talk, since they can be cancelled at no
cost; if not cancelled, they are executed when the market opens. Orders
placed when the market is open are executed immediately. Suppose now
that noise traders arrive randomly at the market, and that noise traders
who place an order at the pre-opening period do not cancel it. Can there be
an equilibrium in which the informed trader is not active at the pre-opening
period? The answer is no. If only noise traders appear at the pre-opening,
then the order flow of the pre-opening provides a signal of the extent of noise
trading, and this signal is taken into account when setting the price at the
opening. For example, if a market maker observes a large demand at the pre-
opening, then she will be inclined to believe that a large demand in the open
market is mostly the result of noise, rather than the consequence of strategic
behavior on the part of the noise trader. This in turn makes the price less
sensitive to the order flow. But this situation cannot be an equilibrium. An
informed trader who receives good news on the asset, so that she is likely
to buy the asset when the market opens, will want to increase the estimate
of noise trading made by the market maker. Thus, she places orders at the
pre-opening. But this contradicts the original assumption that only noise
trading is active at the pre-opening.
The previous argument implies that any equilibrium must see the active
participation of the informed trader at the pre-opening period, even if there
is no positive probability that the market will execute the orders. This in
turn implies that the order flow at the pre-opening provides a signal both
about the extent of noise trading and the value of the asset. It turns out
however that, differently from what happens when the market is open, the
relation between the order flow at the pre-opening period and the value of
the asset is not monotonic. This is a consequence of the fact that at the pre-
opening period the informed trader has no incentive to reveal its information.
The only reason why she is in the market is to garble the message about
liquidity trading, revealing as little as possible of her information. We will
show that a monotonic strategy (that is, a strategy in which the informed
agent places higher orders when the value of the signal is higher) cannot
be part of an equilibrium, which in turn implies that the relation between
the value of the asset and the order flow cannot be monotonic. To sum up,
our theoretical model predicts a quite different behavior at the pre-opening
phase and at the open market, and a non-monotonic relation between the
value of the asset and the order flow at the pre-opening.
We test the predictions of the theoretical model using data from the
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electronic continuous market used in Spain for equity trading, known by
the Spanish acronym SIBE (Sistema de Interconexio´n Bursatil Espan˜ol).
We observe best five levels of limit order book data over a month for the 35
most actively traded stocks in the market in the pre-opening phase. For each
stock we can observe at each moment the equilibrium price and quantity as
well as part of the demand and supply curve. This data can be used to
check whether market behavior is different before and after the pre-opening
of the market. We use LOB data to calculate demand and supply elasticity.
These elasticity measures should be different depending on the moment we
look at demand and supply. Closer to the end of pre-opening rational insider
behavior is different than in pre-opening phase. Different elasticity figures is
a signal of the presence of insiders. This effect should be more pronounced
during pre-opening of highly informative days.
There exist other articles that look at elasticity. In general these articles
look at demand and supply schedules during IPO. The only paper related
with our research is Kalay, Sade and Wohl (2003). They compare elasticity
of pre-opening vs opening period. They document that demand schedule
is more elastic than supply schedule. But our research differ from Kalay,
Sade and Wohl (2003) in some important points. On one hand, they study
the elasticity in two completely different periods while we are interested
in the evolution and behavior of elasticity. As a consequence our study is
closer in spirit to Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) than to Kalay, Sade and
Wohl (2003). On the other, given this comparison idea, we do not scale our
elasticity measures by shares outstanding or volume.
We also have closing prices for stocks, that we can use to proxy for the
value of the asset and check for the relation between asset value and prices
and volume at the pre-opening phase. Results seem to support the theoret-
ical predictions, showing a clear difference in market behavior depending on
the timing of pre-opening.
2 The Model
There is a risky asset which can take a finite number of values:
V = {v1, . . . , vK}
with vi < vi+1 for i = 1, . . . ,K−1. The prior probability distribution of the
value of the asset is given by µ = {µ1, . . . , µK}, with µi being the probability
that the asset will take value vi and µi > 0 each i.
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We will assume that trading activity takes place over two periods, struc-
tured as follows:
Pre-opening period During this period agents place market orders. The
total orders are collected by a market maker, and the net amount is
made public. No trading takes place at this point. We will use the
subscript T (temporary) to refer to the pre-opening period.1
Opening period During this period agents again place market orders. Or-
ders placed at the pre-opening period are considered valid orders, un-
less explicitly cancelled. A market maker observes the total order flow
and determines the price, setting it equal to the expected value of the
asset. Orders are executed, and each agent pays (receives) the price
multiplied by the order placed. We will use the subscript F (final) to
refer to the opening period.
There are two types of traders in the market. The first is an informed
speculator. This speculator observes the value of the asset before the pre-
opening period. We denote by xT the order placed by the informed trader at
the pre-opening period, and by xF the order placed at the opening period
2.
We will assume that orders have to belong to a finite set X = {x1, . . . , xn},
where each xi is an integer number. This is equivalent to assume that
orders have to be multiple of a given minimum quantity, and there is a
bound on the total amount that can be ordered. We also assume 0 ∈ X and
x1 < 0 < xn. We denote by ∆n the n−dimensional simplex, that is the
space of all probability distribution on X.
Beside the informed trader we have noise traders, who can place their
orders both at the pre-opening and at the opening period. The number of
noise traders is random, and each noise trader places an order of size 1 or −1.
The total amount ordered by noise traders at the pre-opening period can
be represented as a random variable euT , with support on the set of integers
1From the theoretical point of view, Back and Baruch (2003) show that under some
assumptions the equilibria of the Glosten-Milgrom model converge to the equilibrium of
the Kyle model. So we are able to use LOB data to test the model.
2For the sake of simplicity we assume that the informed trader cancels the order placed
at the pre-opening period and places a new order. Therefore, when the market is open the
contribution of the informed trader is simply xF . Equivalently, we could assume that the
pre-opening order is confirmed and the agent modifies it with an additional order ∆xF .
In this case the contribution to the order flow in the open market is xT +∆xF . The first
formulation saves notation.
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Z = {. . . ,−1, 0, 1, . . .} and probability distribution q = {. . . , q−1, q0, q1, . . .},
with qi > 0 for each i ∈ Z and
P+∞
−∞ qi = 1.
Similarly, the order placed by noise traders at the opening is represented
by a random variable euF , with support on Z and probability distribution
w = {. . . , w−1, w0, w1, . . .}, with wi > 0 for each i ∈ Z and P+∞−∞wi = 1.
We will assume that noise traders who place an order at the pre-opening
period always confirm the order at the opening period3. The total noise
order placed at the opening period is therefore euT + euF . We will denote
by zT = xT + euT the order flow observed at the pre-opening period and by
zF = xF + euT + euF the order flow observed at the opening period.
Notice that the variable zT is publicly observed before the beginning
of the opening period, and the set of all possible orders observable at the
pre-opening period and at the opening period is the set of integers Z.
A rational expectation equilibrium of this game is given by:
• a price function p : Z × Z → [v1, vK ], where p (zT , zF ) is the price set
when the order flow zT is observed at the pre-opening period and the
order flow zF is observed at the opening period;
• a function ξ : Z × Z × V → ∆n, where ξ (uT , zT , vi) denotes the
probability distribution on X adopted by the informed trader who has
observed vi, an order zT at the pre-opening and a noise order uT at
the pre-opening period4;
• a function δ : V → ∆n, where δ (vi) denotes the probability distribu-
tion on X adopted by the informed trader upon observing vi;
satisfying the following properties:
• The price function p (zT , zF ) is given by:
p (zT , zF ) = E [ev|xT + euT = zT , xF + euT + euF = zF ]
that is p (zT , zF ) is the conditional expected value of the asset given
the observed order flows, where the expectation is taken making use
of the probability distributions δ and ξ;
3This assumption is not essential. All we need is that there is a noise component in the
pre-opening period, and that this noise is not independent of noise trading at the opening
period.
4The informed trader observe the pre-opening order flow zT and knows the part of the
flow due to its own order xT . She can therefore compute the demand coming from noise
traders as uT = zT − xT .
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• for each triplet (uT , zT , vi) the probability distribution ξ (uT , zT , vi) =
(ξ1, . . . , ξn) is such that ξi > 0 only if:
xi ∈ arg max
xF∈X
E [(vi − p (zT , xF + uT + euF ))xF ]
that is an order is placed with positive probability only if it maximizes
the expected profit of the informed trader, where the expectation is
conditional on the informed trader’s information (uT , zT , vi);
• for each vi, the probability distribution δ (vi) = (δ1, . . . , δn) is such
that δi > 0 only if:
xT ∈ arg max
xT∈X
E [(vi − p (xT + euT , xF (euT , xT + euT , vi) + euT + euF ))xF (euT , xT + euT , vi)]
where xF (xT + euT , euT , vi) ∈suppξ (uT , xT + uT , vi) for each triplet
(uT , xT + uT , vi), that is an order xi is placed with positive proba-
bility only if it maximizes the expected profit, taking into account
the optimal policy of the informed trader at the opening period and
conditioning on the known value vi.
We first show that a rational expectation equilibrium exists. The strategy
of the informed trader can be described as follows:
• The strategy at the pre-opening period is a collection (δ (v1) , . . . , δ (vK)),
where for each vi, we have δ (vi) ∈ ∆n. It can therefore be described
as an element of the set ∆n×K . We will adopt the notation Γ = ∆n×K ,
and we let γ denote a generic element of Γ.
• The strategy at the opening can be described as a collection
{ξ (uT , zT , vi)}(uT ,zT )∈Z×Z, vi∈V
where for each triplet (uT , zT , vi) we have ξ (uT , zT , vi) ∈ ∆n. Call
Φ the set of all possible collections, that is each element φ ∈ Φ is
a (countable) list of probability distributions over X, one for each
possible triplet (uT , zT , vi) ∈ Z × Z × V . The set Φ represents the
set of all possible strategies at the opening period. It is a convex and
compact set5.
5See e.g. Royden (1988), chapter 7, exercise 30.
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Let Ω = Γ × Φ the strategy space of the informed trader, a compact and
convex set. Define next the space P of all possible price functions, that is P is
the set of all sequences {p (zT , zF )}(zT ,zF )∈Z×Z such that p (zT , zF ) ∈ [v1, vK ]
for each pair (zT , zF ), and again observe that this is a compact and convex
set.
Define now the correspondence:
p : Ω→ P
as:
pω (zT , zF ) = E
ω [ev| exT + euT = zT , exF + euT + euF = zF ]
that is, for each element ω = (γ,φ) the function p selects, for each pair
(zT , zF ) the expected value of v given that the informed agent uses the strat-
egy described by γ at the pre-opening period and the strategy described by
φ at the opening period. Notice that since both euT and euF have support
on Z and the set X of orders by the informed trader is finite, every pair
(zT , zF ) has positive probability under any strategy ω, so that the condi-
tional expectation is always well defined.
Given a price function p, the expected profit for the informed trader who
has observed (uT , zT , vi) and chosen xF is given by:
Π (xF , p| (uT , zT , vi)) =
X
j∈Z
wj (vi − p (zT , uT + j + xF ))xF
where wj = Pr (uF = j). Let ξ ∈ ∆n be a probability distribution over X,
with ξ (xF ) denoting the probability of choosing xF . Define:
Π (ξ, p| (uT , zT , vi)) =
X
xF∈XF
ξ (xF )Π (xF , p| (uT , zT , vi)) .
Let φ = {ξ (uT , zT , vi)}(uT ,zT )∈Z×Z,vi∈V ∈ Φ represent a policy followed by
the informed trader at the opening period. For a given policy φ we set
Π (φ, p| (uT , zT , vi)) = Π (ξ (uT , zT , vi) , p| (uT , zT , vi))
Next, define the function Π∗ (xT ,φ, p| vi) as:
Π∗ (xT ,φ, p| vi) =
X
j∈Z
qjΠ (φ, p| (j, xT + j, vi))
where qj = Pr (uT = j). For a probability distribution δ = (δ1, . . . , δn) over
X we define:
Π∗ (δ,φ, p| vi) =
nX
k=1
δkΠ (xk,φ, p| vi)
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where δk is the probability of choosing xk. Define the collection γ =
(δv1 , . . . , δvK ), where δvi denotes the probability distribution over X cho-
sen at the pre-opening when the observed value of the asset is vi. We define:
Π (γ,φ, p) =
KX
i=1
Pr (vi)Π (δvi ,φ, p| vi)
and setting ω = (γ,φ) we are going to use the more compact notation
Π (ω, p). We now define the correspondence:
θ : P → Ω
as:
θ (p) = argmax
ω∈Ω
Π (ω, p)
For each price function p the correspondence θ selects the set of profit-
maximizing trading strategies for the informed trader.
We can now prove the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 1 A rational expectation equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since Π (p,ω) is continuous in (p,ω), the theorem of the maximum
ensures that the correspondence θ is u.h.c. and compact-valued. Linearity
in ω ensures that the correspondence is convex-valued. Similarly, the map-
ping p is continuous, convex and compact valued. Therefore, by Kakutani’s
theorem, the mapping:
θ × p : Ω× P → Ω× P
has a fixed point. Given the definitions of θ and p, the fixed point is a
rational expectations equilibrium.
2.1 Characterization of the equilibrium
Once the existence of the equilibrium has been established, we can proceed
to characterize its properties. We remind the reader that a function f (x; t)
satisfies increasing differences if whenever t0 > t, the difference f (x; t0) −
f (x; t) increases in x. Consider now the function Π (ξ, p| (uT , zT , vi)). For
a given price function p and observation (uT , zT ) this can be seen as a
function of ξ and vi. The variable ξ belongs to ∆n, the space of probability
distributions overX. We order∆n using the criterion of first order stochastic
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dominance (FOSD), that is ξ º ξ0 if Pri=1 ξ (xi) ≤ Pri=1 ξ0 (xF ) for each
r ≤ n. We have the following result about the strategy of the informed
trader at the opening.
Lemma 1 For a given price function p and observation (uT , zT ) let ξvi be
an optimal strategy chosen when the observed value of the asset is vi. Then
the strategy of the informed trader at the opening is increasing in vi in the
sense of first order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Take as given p and (uT , zT ), and define f (ξ, vi) = Π (ξ, p| (uT , zT , vi)).
The objective function of the informed
trader is given by:
f (ξ, vi) =
nX
j=1
ξj [vi −E (p (zT , uT + euF + xj))]xj
where the expectation is taken over euF . Therefore, if we take vk > vi we
have:
f (ξ, vk)− f (ξ, vi) = (vk − vi)
nX
j=1
ξjxj
Since vk − vi > 0, this difference is increasing in ξ. Since the objective
function satisfies increasing differences, the optimal action ξ (vi) is non-
decreasing in vi.
We can use lemma 1 to provide a first characterization of the price func-
tion.
Lemma 2 In each rational expectations equilibrium the price function p (zT , zF )
is non-decreasing in zF for each given zT .
Proof. For each given euT , lemma 1 impliesE [v| zT , z0F , euT ] ≥ E [v| zT , zF , euT ]
whenever z0F > zF . This in turn implies:
p
¡
zT , z
0
F
¢
= EeuT £E £v| zT , z0F , euT ¤¤ ≥ EeuT [E [v| zT , zF , euT ]] = p (zT , zF )
The properties of the price function described in lemma 2 are standard.
The informed trader wants to increase the size of its order when she obtains
better information, so that the market maker interprets an increase in the
order flow as a noisy signal of the value of the assets. This leads to a function
p increasing in zF .
10
The more interesting part however is the characterization of the equi-
librium at the pre-opening stage. We start observing that in general at the
pre-opening stage the informed trading must be active, meaning that she
chooses different strategies in dependence of different observed values of the
asset.
Lemma 3 There is no equilibrium in which the informed agent follows a
constant policy at the pre-opening period.
Proof. Suppose first that the informed agent always selects the same quan-
tity x∗ for each value vi, and assume that x∗ > x1, where x1 is the lowest
possible order. This implies that for every order flow zT at the pre-opening
period the market maker is able to infer exactly he amount of noise trading
as uT = zT − x∗.
Consider now the informed agent who has observed v1, the lowest pos-
sible value of the asset. This trader will only post negative orders at the
opening period, since p (zT , zF ) ≥ v1 for each realization (zT , zF ). This im-
plies that in this case the informed agent wants to obtain a price at the
opening which is as high as possible. This in turn implies that she wants to
convince the market maker that the demand at the opening comes mostly
from the informed trader, and liquidity demand is low. Finally, this implies
that upon observing v1 the informed agent can profitably deviate from x
∗
to x1, the lowest possible order.
If x∗ = x1 then we can apply a similar argument to show that the
informed trader has a profitable deviation when the highest possible value
vK for the asset is observed.
The argument can be directly extended to mixed strategies. If the same
mixed strategy is being used by the informed trader for each vi then the
order flow zT is considered by the market maker as a noisy signal of uT ,
with no information about the value of the asset. Then the informed agent
who has observed v1 can profitable deviate to x1, while the informed agent
who has observed vK can profitable deviate to xn.
The lemma implies that in every equilibrium there is non-trivial action
at the pre-opening stage by the informed trader. By this we mean that the
informed trader intervenes at the pre-opening stage selecting different
strategies depending on the information possessed.
The next observation is that in a rational expectations equilibrium the
informed trader does not select a monotonic strategy at the pre-opening
period.
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Lemma 4 There is no equilibrium in which the informed agent adopts a
monotonically increasing policy at the pre-opening period.
Proof. (Sketch) Suppose that the informed agent selects a monotonically
increasing strategy, so that δvi dominates δvj in the sense of first order
stochastic dominance whenever vi > vj . We first observe that in this case,
given two order flows z0T > zT , the conditional probability distribution of
v given z0T first-order stochastically dominates the conditional probability
distribution of v given zT . This follows from the fact that zT is a noisy
signal of xT , which in turn is a noisy signal of v.
Next we observe that the informed trader who has observed vK , the
highest possible value, prefers that the conditional distribution of the market
maker be as low as possible in a FOSD sense, while the informed trader
who has observed v1 has preferences which are exactly the opposite. The
reason is that the only way in which it can be worse for type vK that the
market maker has a lower estimate of v is that in this case the market maker
forecasts a more aggressive bidding by the informed trader, so that the price
function is more sensitive to zF . This would prevent the informed trader
from placing larger orders at the opening. But a more aggressive belief
cannot be self-confirming, because in this case the informed trader would be
less aggressive.
This implies that type vK will want to deviate and adopt at the pre-
opening stage a strategy adopted by lower types, in order to induce a lower
price at the opening. An analogous deviation is available for type v1
What are the empirical predictions of the model presented in this sec-
tion? The existence of the pre-opening period provides information which is
valuable for the determination of the price at the opening, since it provides
a signal on the extent of liquidity demand. The informed trader tries to
manipulate this signal, taking advantage of the fact that the orders placed
in this phase are basically ‘cheap talk’ and can be cancelled at no cost.
In temporary equilibrium the relation between the total order flow and
the
extent of liquidity trading cannot be monotonic. If this were the case, an
informed trader who has a high probability of being on the buying side at the
opening (which happens when a high value of v is observed) would place a
high order, so to convince the market maker that most of the demand comes
from liquidity traders. However, in a final rational expectation equilibrium
this maneuvering cannot occur, since the market maker would consider a
high level of demand at the pre-opening as a signal of a high value of the
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asset.
If a price is computed at the pre-opening stage, and the price is set equal
to expected value of the asset, then the pre-opening price will not have a
monotonic relation with the asset’s value. The monotonic relation is restored
when the market opens, since in this case orders are executed and the only
way in which an informed trader can take advantage of her information is
by following an order strategy monotonically related to the asset value.
We will use LOB data in order to compare different moments of pre-
opening period. Given that we can not detect insider presence and data
do not provide identification code of investors, we will use elasticity mea-
sures as a proxy of aggregated investor behavior and assymetric information.
Changes in supply and demand elasticity figures along pre-opening period
will be a signla of changes in investors behavior.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we provide a description of the institutional features of the
Spanish stock market and of the data we plan to use for the empirical anal-
ysis.
3.1 Institutional Organization of the Spanish Stock Market
The market for equities in Spain (SIBE) is organized as an electronic contin-
uous market. It is a nationally unified market, in which a single order book
exists for each stock. During the period object of the analysis (November
1999) a day of trade was divided into three parts:
1. pre-opening period, from 9:00 am to 10:00 am. In this period mod-
ifications, cancellations and introduction of limit orders are allowed.
Depending on demand and supply on every stock the system calculates
in real time a pre-opening price; when there are multiple equilibrium
prices, the one that maximizes the volume traded is chosen.
At 10:00 am the system determines the opening price. Orders entered
previously and not cancelled are now executed. Priority is first by
price and then by time of introduction.
2. Open Market period, from 10:00 am to 17:00 pm. In this period limit
and market orders are introduced and if a counterpart is found they
are automatically executed. If not, the order remains in the book until
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an incoming order fits it, or the order is cancelled. In this period prices
of the stocks are changing in real time depending on the flow of buy
and sell orders.
3. Special Operations period, from 17:30 pm to 20:00 pm. During this
period pre-agreed block trades are reported.
The market is still organized in this way, but now the pre-opening period
runs from 8:30 am to 9:00 am and the open market period runs from 9:00
am to 17:30 pm.
The open market is an order driven market. De Jong, Nijman and Ro¨ell
(1996), among others, point out that trading mechanism operating in mar-
kets driven by orders can be formally described by the ideal electronic open
limit order book framework proposed by Glosten (1994). Glosten (1994) the-
oretical model show how information flow cause price revisions by trading
throughout the limit order book mechanism. Glosten develops both average
and marginal price functions from the point of view of the agent providing
liquidity. These functions are supply and demand functions. From the em-
pirical point of view Martinez, Rubio and Tapia (2000) and Blanco (1999)
discusses similar functions, and construct supply and demand functions.
These analysis are developed in an open market situation but give us in-
sights about the information that should be present in supply and demand
functions.
The pre-opening period is similar to the open market trading mechanism,
with the important difference that during the pre-opening period there is
no transaction and orders are left unmatched. However, during the pre-
opening period the Exchange uses the order to determine in real time the
equilibrium price and the quantity traded at that price. So, whenever an
order is cancelled, modified or a new order arrives the equilibrium price and
quantity are changed. The opening price is set at 10:00, and the transactions
are actually carried on. BHS describes the pre-opening process of Paris
Bourse, SIBE pre-opening is quite similar to Paris procedure.
3.2 Data and Methodology
The open limit order book contains information about the five best prices
on the selling and buying side for all assets.
Insert Table 1
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Table 1 shows best five levels of one asset at two successive moments
right before the opening of the market and right after the opening of the
market on November 1, 1999. The book (including prices, volume of shares
outstanding at that price and number of orders which supports such vol-
ume) was observable by market participants at every moment during the
pre-opening and the open market period. Investors were also able to ob-
serve the equilibrium price. Furthermore, whenever a new order is entered
the limit order book shows the new values of the variables, while the time
stamp indicates exactly the time of this change (approximated by tenths of
a second).
In November 1999 the continuous system of SIBE included approxi-
mately 132 assets. We analyze the behavior of the 35 most actively traded
stocks.6 Our sample period covers all trading days of November 1999. For
each trading day we consider the time period between 9:30 am and 10:00
am, comprising the last half hour of the pre-opening period.
The predictions of the model spelled out in section 2 are that insiders
behaviour is different in the pre-opening than in open market period. As a
consequence this behaviour should be also different between two any moment
and the end of the pre-opening. One variable that should reflect this differ-
ent behaviour is demand and supply schedules. Closer to the equilibrium
insiders should be present at the end but not in any other moment of the
pre-opening. This evidence will be a signal of structurally different behavior
for the supply and demand functions along pre-opening period. These dif-
ferences should be especially important for stocks exhibiting a high degree
of asymmetric information.
The empirical analysis is intended to answer two questions.
1. Are the supply and demand functions observed at the pre-opening
period different at the end of pre-opening period?
2. Which variables like, volatility or activity variables affect this behav-
ior?
In order to answer these questions and test empirical implications of the
model, we use the Limit Order Book (LOB) and we calculate two slopes
for demand and two slopes for supply. As we mentioned, we consider time
period between 9:30 am and 10:00 am (pre-opening period).
6Activity is measured by mean effective volume six months before the sample period.
15
3.3 Slopes in the pre-opening Period
During the pre-opening period, additionally to demand and supply LOB
provides equilibrium price and quantities. The market calculates these equi-
librium variables. Suppose that you observe the complete LOB at a given
moment, and the equilibrium price P ∗ and volume Q∗ at the same moment.
Table 2 here
With this LOB we can build a complete demand and supply functions.
Insert Figure 1
If we only observe best five levels of LOB instead of complete LOB.
Bid Ask
Qbid1
Qbid2
Qbid3
Qbid4
Qbid5
Pbid1
Pbid2
Pbid3
Pbid4
Pbid5
Qask1
Qask2
Qask3
Qask4
Qask5
Pask1
Pask2
Pask3
Pask4
Pask5
Slopes A and B are given by:
If P ∗ > Pkj →
Ak =
P∗−Pk1
Q∗−Qk1 ∀j > 1
Bk =
P∗−Pk5
Q∗−
P5
j=1
Qkj
where k represent ask or bid prices and j represent level of prices of the
limit order book. See an example: suppose that you observe the LOB of
Table 1, an equilibrium price of P ∗ = 15.65, and an equilibrium quantity of
Q∗ = 35634.
Bid Ask
14094
77
700
12695
5000
17.99
17.90
17.50
17.00
16.75
13.31
14.00
15.00
15.40
15.44
19235
2260
1120
3000
350
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Then bid side slopes are given by:
Abid =
P ∗ − Pbid1
Q∗ −Qbid1
=
15.65− 17.99
35634− 14094 = −0.01086351
Bbid =
P ∗ − Pbid5
Q∗ −P5j=1Qbidj = 15.65− 16.7535634− 32566 = −0.03585398
And ask side slopes by:
Aask =
P ∗ − Pask1
Q∗ −Qask1
=
15.65− 13.31
35634− 19235 = 0.01426916
Bask =
P ∗ − Pask5
Q∗ −P5j=1Qaskj = 15.65− 15.4435634− 25965 = 0.00217189
These slopes give us information about sensitivities of demand and supply
and information asymmetries. Not surprisingly, in order to calculate A
and B slopes, we need two demand (supply) prices higher (lower) than the
equilibrium price.
4 Results
We calculate slopes in the pre-opening when it is possible, that is when there
is an equilibrium and we observe at least two prices in order to be able to
compute the slopes. We are interested in the question of whether the A
slopes are different from the B slopes, so that we calculate one additional
measures: Log(AB )
This measure will capture differences between slopes. When Log(AB ) is
greater (lower) than 0 A is greater (lower) than B. this variable will permit
to observe changes in both slopes. Given degree of transparency, it could
be the case that observed quotes are not closest prices from equilibrium
price (like the example). In order to match theory, and avoid this problem,
we select from the whole sample observations where equilibrium price is
between best first and fifth level of LOB. Additionally, we eliminate extreme
observations of our sample. So, results are derived from the restricted simple
without extreme values. An observation is considered an extreme one if it
exceeds three times standard deviation.
17
In order to separate different effects, we will use two different variables.
First is time to pre-opening to end. To capture seasonality effects we divide
our sample in three different periods, one for each ten minutes interval. It is
well known the last minutes of the pre-opening period tend to be more active
(see Biais et al (1999) for evidence on Paris and Sola (2000) for Madrid).
Additionally, one consequence of the model is that the behavior of investors
is different in pre-opening depending on the time before the end. Both effects
should be present in the level and changes of slopes.
Second effect is cross section effect. Although, we only consider 35 assets,
Spanish stock exchange is a concentrated market. Over 132 firms, selected
35 firms represent more that 90% of effective volume of the whole sample.
Additionally, we divide our 35 sample into 5 activity groups. Next table
show group effective volume a month before the study. We can observe that
subsamples are so different.
Insert Table 3-I
Table 3-II median of values the sample
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2
Looking at classification by activity group, we observe that groups 4
and 3 have higher values of slopes bothn on Ask and Bid. One result is that
Log(AB ), it is interesting to observe that slopes A and B of largest companies
are more equal than the other companies.
We find greater number of observations as the end of pre-opening period
comes closer. In general, looking at Log(AB ) results it seems that ask and bid
side differ in their behavior. On one hand, Ask side show a median rising
value at least if we compare first ten minutes with the rest of the sample.
This results implies that A slope on the ask side becomes greater (between
2 and 3 times) than B or B is more elastic. This implies that prices close to
equilibrium are more liquid. On the other hand, Bid side median Log(AB )
variable becomes closer to cero. As in the Ask side, A is greater than B but
contrary to Ask result differences between both slopes are decreasing and
both slopes are becoming more inelastic.
If we take into account the whole sample, assets with the largeest level of
activity (5) are the ones with most observations. However, if we only look at
restricted sample, then the group with more observations is group 5. Addi-
tionally, the number of observations is not monotonic in the capitalization.
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In fact, group 3 firms have a greater number of slope observations than the
any other activity classification except group 5. As expected, the number
of observations computed in a given time interval during the pre-opening
period increases as the time approaches the opening period.
4.1 Seasonality and Cross-sectional Effects
The first analysis we carry out is about seasonality. In order to capture
seasonality effects we construct 3 dummy variables in the pre-opening period,
one for ten minutes interval. We run one regression. Results are in table 3.
yit = α+ β2D2 + β3D3 + εit
Insert table 4
where β2and β3 refers to 20 to 10 minutes to end pre-opening and 10 to 0
minutes to end pre-opening and yit refers to either slope A, B or Log(
A
B )
either bid or ask.
We can observe some important differences between slopes and between
ask and bid side. Looking at ask results, table shows that pre-opening ending
implies that market ask side becomes more elastic and as a consequence
more liquid, that is equilibrium price is less sensitive to changes in order
flow.This increase in liquidity is higher in A slopes so higher improvement
of liquidity is far away from equilibrium price. This result implies that
liquidity improvement occurs far away from the equilibrium price so there
are less insider camouflage opportunities close to equilibrium price. However,
this result is not confirmed by Log(AB ) .
When we look at bid results A slope does not significantly change. We
observe the opposite result in B slope. B slope changes are significant and
negative. This implies lower liquidity around equilibrium price (absolute
value of slope is rising). Given the value of Log(AB ) for the bid side, A
slope is greater than bid slope close to equilibrium price but less that at the
begining of the pre-opening period.
We calculate cross-sectional effects in the same way. we construct five
dummy variables, one for each group considered. Given the differences
among groups, we should expect different degree of asymmetric informa-
tion and as a consequence different slope behavior. We run one regression
for each endogeneous variable. Results are in table 5.
yit = α+ β4D4 + β3D3 + β2D2 + β1D1 + εit
19
Insert table 5
where yit refers to either slope A, B or Log(
A
B ) and to either bid or ask.
One interesting result is that, groups of lowest and highest activity show
higher elasticity. So, highest and lowest levels of activity are more liquid
than groups 4 and 3. Although Log(AB ) variable present similar idea, we
observe that on ask side constant is not statistically different from zero.
This implies that A and B slopes are not statistically different. But this
result does not maintain for the rest of the groups where results are similar
among them. On the other hand, Bid side present a completely different
result for Log(AB ) . In this case, group 5 is different from zero and the
other groups are not homogeneous. The last result show a different degree
of asymmetric information between both sides depending on the group we
look at.
4.2 Volatility effect
The volatility of asset prices is influenced by the rate at which new informa-
tion arrives and by the rate at which private information is disclosed. Since
the predictions of our model depend on the presence of informed traders, it
is useful to see how volatility influences the pre-opening slopes of demand
and supply curves.
First, we should construct a volatility measure. Based solely on Andersen
et al (2001) we construct daily volatility measure. We first define returns
as:
r (j, t) = Log (S (j, t))− Log (S (j − 1, t))
where S is the price of asset on day t between j and j-1 time interval.
Second, daily volatility proxy is a mean average of absolute value of returns.
σ2S =
1
N [
P
abs (r (j, t))]
Third, given that we try to detect differences in asymmetric information
level we calculate a ratio between each asset volatility variable by mean
sample volatility of assets included in the sample.
R
¡
σ2S
¢
=
σ2S
1
N [
P
σ2S]
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In addition, we detect two most volatile days for each asset and build a
dummy variable for those days. First analysis we carry out is a regression
analysis with these dummy variable (D90) which takes value 1 if
R
¡
σ2S
¢
belongs to the top deciles and 0 otherwise. These observations in
which D90 = 1 correspond to days and assets in which important movements
occur from pre-opening to closing price, presumably because of information
disclosure. We run the next regression for each side and each variable.
yit = α+ βD90 + ε
Insert table 6
Results can be summarize indicating that arrival information days ex-
hibit different behavior in pre-opening slopes. Slopes are greater or equal
than days of lower volatility that slopes is more inelastic or the market is less
liquid. This result implicates that before higher volatility days we can detect
higher asymmetric information level and as a consequence more inelastic de-
mand and supply curves. Looking at Ask slopes, A slope is more inelastic
and B is not different. Contrary to this result Log(AB ) is lower on volatility
days. So, volatile days are less liquid and investors are more confident about
the absence of information and as a consequence the lower level of liquidity.
When we observe Bid side, slopes become greater in absolute value. This
change is greater in B slope. Again, Log(AB ) does not significantly change.
Bid side is less liquid those volatile days.
Given the role of volatility in the analysis, we look at interactions be-
tween time dummy and volatility dummy in order to capture different be-
havior those volatile days. We run the next regression.
yit = α+ β2D2 + β3D3 + β90D90 + γ290 (D2 ∗D90) +γ390 (D3 ∗D90) + εit
Insert table 7
Looking at results interaction show different sign that direct effects when
they are significant. This effect is specially important in Log(AB ) variable and
in B Bid variable. A Ask direct coefficient . These volatile days, Ask Log(AB )
variable, exhibit higher differences in asymmetric information captured by
interaction coefficients. With possitive coeficient in direct coefficient (β90)
and negative coefficients of indirect effects (γ290, γ
3
90). Similar results can
be found in B slope on the Bid side but not on Log(AB ) variable. Main
conclusions of this table are that interactions are relevant in order to explain
slopes behavior on higher volatility days and interactions coefficients are of
different sign than direct coefficient.
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The second analysis related with information arrival use volatility and ac-
tivity variables to explain the behavior of slopes. Now instead of pre-opening
observations, we summarize slopes information in two different measures.
First measure is a mean of slopes values for each asset each day. Second
measure is a dispersion ones. We define
yi,MaxMin =Max (yit)−Min (yit)
To carry out this analysis we will use daily observations and we run the
next regression
yit = α+ γ1Log
³
R(σ2S,t−1)
´
+ γ2Log (NMSit−1) + γ3Log (V olit−1) + εit
where yit can be mean of slopes for each day and each asset or the dispersion
measure, yi,MaxMin. Exogeneous variables are measure the day before and
they are volatility, Normal Market Size (effective volume per transaction)
and Volume in shares.7
Insert table 8
First result of the table is that signs are consistent that is exogenous
variables affect in the same way to endogenous variables. Higher volatility
and shares volume the day before implies higher liquidity. Contrary effect is
Normal Market Size variable. Normal Market Size decrease liquidity becom-
ing more inelastic demand and supply schedules. Complementary analysis is
given by analyzing if contemporary volatility measure with yi,MaxMin affect
slope behavior. We run next regression.
yit = α+ γ1Log (σit−1) + γ2Log (NMSit−1) + γ3Log (V olit−1) +
γAAi,MaxMin + γBBi,MaxMin + εit
Results are included in table 9.
Insert table 9
Looking at results we observe that contemporary dispersion measures
affect mean slopes. Signs and significance show that greater dispersion in
slopes afect negatively to liquidity closer or not of the equilibrium. It is
important to note that results are so similar when we use median instead
mean slope measure. Greater dispersion that is greater range between max-
imum and minimum or greater differences of opinion becomes less liquid the
market. This result is asymmetric for both sides and both slopes.
7A correlation analysis show that there is no multicolineality problems.
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5 Conclusions
We can consider at least three reason why pre-opening is an important
period. Protocol procedure is different from open market period,, it provides
price discovery, and investors use it as an important part of the market. In
SSE pre-opening can cross between 20 and 30% of daily effective volume.
Our model implies that a rational expectation equilibrium exists with the
active participation of the informed trader and uninformed traders. An im-
portant theoretical result is that informed trader selects different strategies
depending on the information possessed.
The empirical part is based on the study of behavior of LOB slopes. Main
results indicate behavior of investors is different depending where they put
the orders, close or not to the equilibrium price. Slopes show great degree
of time dependency abnd size effect.
Additionally, some variables affect behavior of slopes and Information
arrival days exhibit different behavior in pre-opening slopes.
Most important result is that contemporary dispersion measure or a
measure of differences in opinion has a direct impact on slope level. Greater
differences imply steper slopes or less liquid market. Also, this result is true
for both sides and both slopes.
These results are consistent with our model.
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Table 1  
LOB at 9:59:59 
Bid Ask 
14094 17.99 13.31 19235 
77 17.90 14.00 2260 
700 17.50 15.00 1120 
12695 17.00 15.40 3000 
5000 16.75 15.44 350 
 
LOB at 10:00:10 
Bid Ask 
151 15.54 15.70 2534 
1537 15.53 15.71 1336 
835 15.50 15.72 1200 
1300 15.48 15.73 504 
3000 15.47 15.74 3307 
 
Table 2 
LOB at 9:59:59 
Bid Ask 
14094 17.99 13.31 19235 
77 17.90 14.00 2260 
700 17.50 15.00 1120 
12695 17.00 15.40 3000 
5000 16.75 15.44 350 
3068 16.50 15.60 9669 
2000 14.00 15.70 1000 
5673 12.00 17.00 3345 
P*=15,65 
Q* =35634 
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Table 3-I 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table contains Descriptive Statistics of Size Groups looking at Effective Volume (EV) 
 
Panel A: Slope Classification by Activity  
Size Group 
Group EV/ 
Total Sample EV
Group EV/ 
Market EV 
5 (largest) 82.1 74.8 
4 10.6 9.6 
3 4.0 3.8 
2 2.0 1.8 
1 (smallest) 1.3 1.3 
Total 100.0 91.3 
 
Table 3-II 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table contains Descriptive Statistics of slopes in preopening. (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, 
Log(A/B) BID). 
 
Panel A: Median Slope. 
Classification by Activity 
 Ask   Bid 
  A B Log(A/B) A B Log(A/B) 
5 (largest)  0.098 0.118 0.017 -0.074 -0.030 0.575 
4  0.197 0.061 0.967 -0.178 -0.185 0.083 
3  0.205 0.050 1.226 -0.217 -0.174 0.222 
2  0.070 0.019 1.145 -0.095 -0.052 0.553 
1 (smallest)  0.088 0.024 1.021 -0.078 -0.031 0.651 
All sample  0.116 0.041 0.862 -0.119 -0.070 0.504 
 
 
 
Panel B: Median Slope. 
Classification by Minute 
 Ask Bid 
Min.  A B LOG(A/B) A B LOG(A/B) 
0-9  0.141 0.061 0.675 -0.144 -0.035 0.889 
10-19  0.160 0.050 0.942 -0.120 -0.067 0.447 
20-29  0.084 0.034 0.859 -0.118 -0.101 0.320 
All sample 0.116 0.041 0.862 -0.119 -0.070 0.504 
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Table 4 
Dummy Time Regression  
 
This table contains the time series coefficients of slopes in preopening. The dependent variable is one of 
the slope variable (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, Log(A/B) BID). The explanatory variables are 
two dummy variables that capture time till the end of the preopening period effect. ***, ** and * 
indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
jj DDy εββα +++= 3322  
 
 Ask Bid 
 A  B  Log(A/B)  A  B  Log(A/B)  
α  0.454 *** 0.457 *** 0.868 ***-0.370***-0.395*** 0.905 *** 
2β -0.039  0.040  0.172 ** -0.019  -0.273*** -0.441 *** 
3β -0.218 ***-0.110 ** 0.051  0.003  -0.191*** -0.426 *** 
 
Table 5 
Activity Effect Regression  
 
This table contains the Activity influence on slopes in preopening. The dependent variable is one of the 
slope variable (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, Log(A/B) BID). The explanatory variables are four 
dummy variables that capture Activity or Size effect. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
jj DDDDy εββββα +++++= 11223344  
 
 ASK BID 
 A  B  Log(A/B)  A  B  Log(A/B)  
α  0.239 *** 0.552 *** -0.096  -0.403***-0.553*** 0.522 ***
4β 0.344 ***-0.081  1.210 ***-0.263***-0.521*** -0.240 ** 
3β 0.246 *** 0.129  1.258 ***-0.035  -0.134 * -0.138  
2β -0.053***-0.339*** 1.231 *** 0.166 *** 0.289 *** 0.126  
1β  -0.010  -0.328*** 1.205 *** 0.200 *** 0.191 ** 0.335 ***
 
Table 6 
Volatility Dummy Regression  
 
This table contains volatility influence on slopes in preopening. The dependent variable is one of the 
slope variable (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, Log(A/B) BID). The explanatory variable is a 
Dummy variable that reflect higher volatility day. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
jj Dy εβα ++= 9090  
 
 Ask Bid 
 A  B  Log(A/B)  A  B  Log(A/B)  
α  0.349*** 0.429 *** 0.969 ***-0.367***-0.557*** 0.560 *
90β 0.062 ** -0.009  -0.212 ** -0.068 * -0.177 ** 0.018  
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Table 7 
Time of Pre-opening and Volatility Dummy Regression  
 
This table contains Time of Preopening, Activity and Volatility influence on slopes in preopening 
including interaction effects. The dependent variable is one of the slope variable (AASK, BASK, 
Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, Log(A/B) BID). The explanatory variables are Dummy variables that reflect 
Time of Preopening, Activity and higher volatility day and interaction among them. ***, ** and * 
indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ( ) ( ) jj DDDDDDDy εγγβββα ++++++= 90339090329090903322 **  
 
 Ask Bid 
 A B Log(A/B) A B Log(A/B) 
α  0.458 *** 0.435 *** 0.949 *** -0.358 *** -0.418 *** 0.892 *** 
2β  -0.051  0.077  0.098  -0.024  -0.208 *** -0.436 *** 
3β  -0.231 *** -0.088  -0.039  -0.003  -0.145 *** -0.401 *** 
90β  -0.048  0.209  -0.804 *** -0.089  0.164 ** 0.092  
2
90γ  0.139 * -0.400 *** 0.726 * 0.037  -0.492 *** -0.033  
3
90γ  0.145 ** -0.217  0.920 *** 0.019  -0.413 *** -0.219  
 
Table 8 
Volatility Regression.  
 
This table contains volatility and activity variables influence on slopes and dispersion measures in 
preopening. The dependent variable is one of the slope or dispersion variable (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, 
ABID, BBID, Log(A/B)BID) as an average of each variable or the dispersion ones (AASK,MaxMin, BASK,MaxMin, 
Log(A/B)ASK,MaxMin, ABID,MaxMin, BBID,MaxMin, Log(A/B)BID,MaxMin). The explanatory variables are volatility 
measure as Andersen et al (2001), natural logarithm of Mean Effective Normal Market Size for each asset 
and natural logarithm of Mean Volume in shares. All variables are measured the day before for each asset 
in the sample. ***, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 ( ) jjtitStit VolLogNMSLogσRy εγγγα ++++= −−− )()( 13122 11  
 Ask Bid 
 A  B  Log(A/B)  A  B  Log(A/B)  α  1.503 *** 1.391 ** 1.622 ** -0.396 ** -1.455 *** -0.872  
1γ  -0.105 *** -0.098  -0.196  0.040  0.162 ** 0.342 *
2γ  0.397 *** 0.178  1.207 *** -0.663 *** -0.677 *** 0.348  
3γ  -0.236 *** -0.161 ** -0.334 *** 0.153 *** 0.277 *** 0.111  
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Table 9 
Volatility Regression.  
 
This table contains volatility activity and dispersion measures influence on slopes in preopening 
dispersion of each of the variables considered in the analysis. The dependent variable is one of the slope 
variable (AASK, BASK, Log(A/B)ASK, ABID, BBID, Log(A/B)BID) as an average of each variable each day. 
The explanatory variables are volatility measure as Andersen et al (2001), natural logarithm of Mean 
Effective Normal Market Size for each asset and natural logarithm of Mean Volume in shares. All 
variables are measured the day before for each asset in the sample. Dispersion measures are defined as 
maximum minus minimum of the slopes estimated for each day and each asset. ***, ** and * indicates 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 ( ) itMaxMinBMaxMinAjtititit BAVolLogNMSLogσRy εγγγγγα ++++++= −−− )()( 13122 11  
 
 Ask Bid 
 A  B  A  B  α  1.096 *** 0.881 ** -0.340 *** -0.431 * 
1γ  -0.048  -0.109  0.030 ** 0.074 ** 
2γ  0.289 *** -0.028  -0.226 *** -0.090  
3γ  -0.180 *** -0.077  0.078 *** 0.061 * 
Aγ  0.525 *** -  -0.579 *** -  
Bγ  -  0.527 *** -  -0.639 *** 
 
